Kantian Equilibrium, Externalities and Social Ethos | Public Lecture

July 16, 2026

• Title: Kantian Equilibrium, Externalities and Social Ethos | Public Lecture
• Speaker: Prof. John Roemer | Yale University
• Date: Thursday, March. 8, 2012
• Time: 4:00 PM
• Room: BA112

Summary

Although evidence accrues in biology, anthropology and experimental economics that homo sapiens is a cooperative species, the reigning assumption in economic theory is that individuals optimize in an autarkic manner (as in Nash and Walrasian equilibrium). I here postulate an interdependent kind of optimizing behavior, called Kantian. It is shown that in simple macro-economic models, when there are negative externalities (such as congestion effects from use of a commonly owned resource) or positive externalities (such as a social ethos reflected in individuals’ preferences), Kantian equilibria dominate Nash-Walras equilibria in terms of efficiency. While economists schooled in Nash equilibrium may view the Kantian behavior as utopian, there is some – perhaps much -- evidence that it exists. If cultures evolve through group selection, the hypothesis that Kantian behavior is more prevalent than we may think is supported by the efficiency results here demonstrated.

Biography

John Roemer is the Elizabeth S. and A. Varick Stout Professor of Political Science and Economics at Yale University. His workconcerns distributive justic, political economy, and the relationship between them. Recent books are Racism, Xenophobia, and Redistribution (HAvard UP, 2007), Democracy, education and equality (Cambridge UP, 2006), Theories of distributive justice (Haveard UP, 1996), and A future for siocialism (havard UP, 1994). He is a fellow of the Econometric Society, the American Academy of Arts and Science, a corresponsding fellow of the British Academiy, and a past fellow of the Guggenheim and Russell Sage Foundations.